



## **Implementation of the EU 2020 Renewables Target in the UK Electricity Sector: RO Reform**

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No new nuclear build sensitivities

18<sup>th</sup> August 2009

# Introduction





- The initial modelling, undertaken to analyse the impact of the changes to the Renewables Obligation, included new nuclear as an investment option
- The modelling suggested that under the Base commodity price case 9.6 GW of new nuclear capacity would be built by 2030, which is the limit imposed by build constraint assumptions
- DECC has asked Redpoint to run sensitivities on 2 cases with the assumption that there is no new investment in nuclear prior to 2030:
  - Minimum Change Base 29% Renewables (Min. Ch. Base 29)
  - Minimum Change High High 28% Renewables (Min. Ch. High High 28)
- Note that a Minimum Change High High 29% case has not previously been run, therefore it was not possible to use this as a basis for a High High commodity price sensitivity
- The key aim of the sensitivity analysis is to understand the impact on investment in new nuclear on investment in renewables
- Assumptions on existing nuclear plant remain unchanged

# New Entry Costs (LRMCs)



Minimum Change Base 29

Minimum Change High High 28




- The graphs shows the new entry costs for thermal technologies under the Base and High High commodity price assumptions
- It is clear that nuclear is the Best New Entrant in both cases (by a very large margin in the High High case)
- Therefore the No Nuclear sensitivities are expected to show a net welfare disbenefit, resulting from the substitution of new nuclear capacity with a higher cost technology


# New plant build: Base



Minimum Change Base 29



Minimum Change Base 29 No Nuclear




- The graphs shows the cumulative new build
- In the Min Change Base 29, new nuclear build reaches 9.6 GW by 2030
- In the No Nuclear run, CCGT build increases from 24 GW to 33 GW by 2030, therefore overall there is almost a one-for-one replacement of nuclear with CCGT capacity
- The effect on renewables investment is discussed in Slide 6


# New plant build: High High



Minimum Change High High 28



Minimum Change High High 28 No Nuclear




- In the Min Change High High, there is both CCGT and ASC Coal + CCS build in the post 2020 period
- During the first half of the 2020s, the total amount of new thermal capacity is lower in the No Nuclear Case as initially the investment in CCGT and ASC + CCS does not change
- By 2030, new investment in both these technologies has increased compared to the Min Change High High 28, from 25 to 32 GW for CCGT and 14.5 to 15.5 GW for ASC + CCS


# Renewables build



Minimum Change Base 29




Minimum Change High High 28



- The graphs shows the cumulative renewables new build in selected years
- Under both the Base and the High High commodity price assumptions, the target achieved in 2020 is little changed in the No Nuclear case
- In the Base Case the renewable target achieved increases marginally from 29.0% to 29.2%
- In the High High Case the renewable target achieved increases marginally from 28.1% to 28.2%
- By 2030, the difference has become more significant under both sets of commodity price assumptions

# Carbon emissions




- In the sensitivities with no new nuclear, carbon emissions are higher from 2019 onwards
- This is because in the No Nuclear cases there is significantly more output from gas plant, due to the new CCGT capacity that has been built
- The overall increase in carbon dioxide over the modelling period is 164 million tonnes in the Base Case and 177 million tonnes in the High High Case
- The difference is larger in the High High Case because the substituted plant is built later, means that older, less efficient plant run at higher load factors in the interim


# De-rated peak capacity margins and wholesale prices



De-rated peak capacity margin




Wholesale prices



- Under the Base commodity price assumptions, the average level of the peak de-rated capacity margin is similar with and without nuclear build, and wholesale price levels are also similar
- Under the High High commodity prices, the average level of the de-rated capacity margin is lower in the No Nuclear case after 2020, due the lower level of thermal build
  - However the capacity margins are still at a reasonable level compared to the Min Change Base Case
- Both Base and High High No Nuclear cases show a reduction in capacity margin in 2020, the year when the first new nuclear plant comes on in the Cases where nuclear is allowed



# Expected Energy Unserved



- The graph shows the Expected Energy Unserved in each Case
- These numbers do not include energy unserved due to outages on the Transmission and Distribution systems, which are of the order of 10 GWh/annum
- It is clear that under the High High commodity price assumptions, the No Nuclear shows an increase in expected energy unserved, however this is still below the level of the Base Case

# Cost Benefit Analysis



- CBA shows significant net welfare disbenefit in both cases
- The key driver of this is the replacement of nuclear with a higher cost technology such as CCGT
- There is also some negative impact from the increased renewables investment after 2020 in the No Nuclear cases
- In the High High case, the overall amount of new thermal capacity is lower throughout the 2020s. If there had been a one-for-one replacement of capacity, the net welfare reduction would be much greater

<i>Change in annual welfare, NPV £m (real 2008)</i>		<b>Min. Ch. Base 29 No Nuclear</b>	<b>Min. Ch. High High 28 No Nuclear</b>
<b>Net Welfare</b>	Carbon saved	-1,952	-5,679
	Less increase in resource costs	-8,625	-7,121
	Less increase in unserved energy	-47	-29
	Less increase in demand side response	-5	-12
	<b>Change in Net Welfare</b>	<b>-10,629</b>	<b>-12,841</b>
<b>Consumer Surplus</b>	Change in wholesale price	-6,922	-19,634
	Change in balancing costs	-626	-126
	Change in unserved energy	-47	-29
	Change in demand side response	-5	-12
	Change in net renewables subsidy	-5,536	-57
	Change in administration costs	-2	0
	Change in CCL	267	52
	Change in VAT	-212	-328
	<b>Change in Consumer Surplus</b>	<b>-13,082</b>	<b>-20,134</b>
<b>Producer Surplus</b>	Change in wholesale price	6,922	19,634
	Change in balancing revenues	626	126
	Change in net renewables subsidy	5,536	57
	Change in generation costs	-10,575	-12,800
	<b>Change in Producer Surplus</b>	<b>2,508</b>	<b>7,017</b>
	<i>Change in renewables rent</i>	3,218	4,783
<i>Change in non-renewables rent</i>	-710	2,235	
<b>Treasury Receipts</b>	Change in CCL	-267	-52
	Change in VAT	212	328
	<b>Change in Treasury Receipts</b>	<b>-55</b>	<b>275</b>

# Sensitivities: Key messages



- Investment in new nuclear capacity has only a limited impact on investment in renewables
- When nuclear build is disallowed, other new thermal capacity (CCGT, ASC + CCS) is built instead
- Under the assumptions used in the modelling, preventing new nuclear build has a significant net welfare disbenefit because nuclear has a lower Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) than the other thermal technologies which are built instead
- The increase in carbon dioxide emissions due to disallowing nuclear is up to 20 mtCO<sub>2</sub>/annum in these sensitivities